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Abstract—Recent advances in Machine Learning (ML) have
led to its broad adoption in a series of power system applica-
tions, ranging from meter data analytics, renewable/load/price
forecasting to grid security assessment. Although these data-
driven methods yield state-of-the-art performances in many tasks,
the robustness and security of applying such algorithms in
modern power grids have not been discussed. In this paper,
we attempt to address the issues regarding the security of
ML applications in power systems. We first show that most
of the current ML algorithms proposed in power systems are
vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are maliciously crafted
input data. We then adopt and extend a simple yet efficient
algorithm for finding subtle perturbations, which could be used
for generating adversaries for both categorical (e.g., user load
profile classification) and sequential applications (e.g., renewables
generation forecasting). Case studies on classification of power
quality disturbances and forecast of building loads demonstrate
the vulnerabilities of current ML algorithms in power networks
under our adversarial designs. These vulnerabilities call for
design of robust and secure ML algorithms for real world
applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
The modern power systems, with deeper penetration of
renewable generation and higher level of demand-side par-
ticipation, are faced with increasing degree of complexities
and uncertainties [1], [2]. Reliable operation of the grid in
this context calls for improved techniques in system modeling,
assessment and decision making [3], [4], [5]. On the one hand,
smart meters and advanced sensing technologies have made
the collection of fine-grained electricity data, both historical
and streaming, available to system operators [6]. On the other
hand, there is an urgent need of efficient and near real-time
algorithms to analyze and make better use of these available
data.
Recent advancements on Machine Learning (ML) algo-
rithms, especially the giant leaps on deep learning, make ML
a good candidate in solving a series of data-driven problems
in power systems [7]. To name a few, ML methods such as
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) can find its straightforward
applications in wind/solar power and building load forecast-
ing [8], [9], [10]. In [4], [11], ML algorithms are applied on
power grid outage detection; while in [6], deep convolutional
neural networks are adopted for classifying user load profiles.
Planning and control problems in power systems, such as
HVAC control and grid protection policy-making, can also be
solved via ML approaches [9], [12]. All of the algorithms
mentioned above have achieved either better performances
compared to traditional model-based methods, or have proven
to be computationally more efficient. These progresses have
shown the great potential of applying ML in power systems.
However, since power systems are at the core of critical
infrastructures, we are taking a step back cautiously, and
asking ourselves two simple yet not-answered questions:
“Is ML in power systems vulnerable to data attacks?
Are vulnerabilities of ML-integrated power systems easy to
deciper by an adversary?”
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Fig. 1: The schematic of the proposed attack on ML in
power systems. (Black) Normal ML operations, which learn
from the given raw data and has various applications in
power systems; (Red) without knowing any knowledge of
targeted ML model (Blue), attackers could generate adversarial
examples by only using raw data. Such adversaries would
exploit the vulnerabilities of the targeted ML models.
Unfortunately, in this paper, we answer both these questions
affirmatively. By adopting and extending the algorithms pro-
posed in [13], [14], we show that most of the ML algorithms
designed for power systems are vulnerable to adversarial
data manipulation, often under very weak assumptions on
adversarial ability. As depicted in Fig. 1, attackers do not
need any access to the operating ML model itself. Using
limited access to the input data, one can generate adversarial
data by injecting designed perturbations to the original data.
The operating ML model’s performance (e.g., classification
accuracy) is greatly impaired with these adversarial inputs.
To demonstrate that such vulnerabilities broadly exist in
currently proposed ML algorithms for power systems, we
show two typical cases on categorical and time-series cases
respectively. In the first case, we successfully attack a power
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quality disturbances classifier [4], [11], which leads to a
misclassification of over 70% of given adversarial voltage sig-
nals (e.g., label sage signals as normal). In the second case, we
consider an RNN-based building load forecasting model [9],
[15]. After imposing crafted perturbations on input variables
such as the temperature setpoints and building occupancies,
the attack results in a significant performance degradation in
the sense that the predicting accuracy drops by a factor of ten.
The adversaries in both cases thus exhibit detrimental impacts
on power system operations.
A. Contributions
In the area of computer vision, researchers have found that
Neural Network models behave poorly on some crafted images
created by simply adding noises to clean images [16]. This
kind of misbehavior on noisy input may be more hazardous
for highly automated power systems, since one single wrong
decision made by the ML model could undermine the secure
operation and lead to a large scale blackout. In light of the
criticality of secure sensing and estimation in power grids,
this paper includes the following key contributions:
• We highlight and discuss the general security issues of
ML algorithms in power systems.
• We propose an efficient attacking strategy, which could
find the vulnerabilities of ML algorithms in both static
and transient cases.
• We provide detailed numerical simulations of the pro-
posed adversarial algorithm design, which reveal the
vulnerabilities of current ML approaches. We also open-
source our code for reproducing the results and testing
the security of other physical-ML integrated systems1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we discuss the general model setup for learning problems in
power systems; in Section III we describe our implementations
of attacks on ML models; in Section IV we show two
representative cases of vulnerabilities on current algorithms;
we draw conclusions in Section V with more discussions on
the security and robustness of ML model in power systems.
II. MACHINE LEARNING IN POWER SYSTEMS
In this section, we briefly review the ML models of interest,
along with the specific model architecture in the case of Neural
Networks. We also introduce the model setup of Recurrent
Neural Networks (RNN), which is a powerful modeling and
learning algorithm for sequential data.
A. Learning Task
Machine Learning provides tools for learning the patterns
or relationship in available data, which can be generalized to
the future operation and decision-making in power systems.
The supervised learning setup is normally considered, where
a paired training dataset X,Y is given. X,Y are vectors
of fixed dimensions. For instance, in the case of power
quality classification, X are the collected fixed-length power
1Code repository: https://github.com/chennnnnyize/PowerAdversary
signals, while Y are the one-hot encoded vectors of respective
labels [4]. The ML model aims to learn a function fθ(X) that
maps from X to Y with model parameters θ. For convenience,
we sometimes suppress the θ symbol. In order to find such
mapping, we consider the general algorithm,
θ∗ = argmin
θ
L(fθ(X), Y ) (1)
where L(·, ·) is a pre-defined loss function. For instance, L2
loss can be directly used to determine the distance, which is
commonly used in LASSO along with L1 regularization on
θ; while in the case of classification using Neural Networks,
we may choose cross-entropy for L(·, ·), and in the case of
regression via Neural Networks, an L2 loss is feasible to
determine the deviation of model’s outputs from true values.
Since many of the ML applications [12], [9], [4] have fo-
cused on utilizing the learning and representation capabilities
provided by Neural Networks, here we briefly illustrate the
learning procedure on Neural Networks’ parameters (neurons’
weights). Neural Networks are composed of stacked, differ-
entiable “neuronal” layers, such as fully connected layers,
convolutional layers and activation functions. It is powerful
in learning tasks with high-dimensional X and Y . Though
there are many variants of the iterative steps, the standard
back-propagation procedure via gradient descent for updating
model weights is summarized as follows,
θi+1 = θi − η∇θL(fθ(X), Y ) (2)
where η is the learning rate, and the subscripts on θ denote
the iteration steps on the weight parameters of the Neural
Networks. Once the model is trained using X,Y via (1) and
(2), we get an accurate model fθ∗ . Recent progresses on deep
learning have enabled Neural Networks composed of millions
of neurons to outperform all other algorithms in many real-
world applications [7].
B. RNN Model
In many cases, the states in power systems are not static,
but rather evolve in a sequential manner. For instance, the
future solar power and wind generation have temporal and
spatial correlations. Under this scenario, Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN) becomes a good fit as its structure allows
it to model temporal dependencies for sequence data [17].
Modeling via RNN requires a group of sequential input
sample x = {x0, ..., xT }, where T is the memory length.
The weight coefficient of RNN consists of three subsets:
θin,t, θout,t and θhiddent,t. RNN also allows for linked neurons
between neighboring timesteps. The t-timestep RNN cell is
using inputs from hidden state ht and input xt, and delivers
outputs yˆt as well as next step’s hidden state ht+1. The t-step
RNN cell then completes the following computations:
yˆt = fθin,t,θout,t(xt, ht) (3a)
ht+1 = fθhidden,t,θin,t(xt, ht) (3b)
By stacking such cells over time, the hidden state can be
used to store and transfer the input information from previous
t+1 t+2tt-1
t+1 t+2tt-1
... ...
Input
Output
Neurons
X
inθ
hiddenθ
outθ
Y
Fig. 2: Basic RNN structure composed of hidden, input and
output neurons. The output yˆT is a function of sequential input
x0, ..., xT . with a memory length T .
steps. With a memory length of T , the output yˆT is essentially
a function of x0, ..., xT . We can then conclude that RNN’s
modeling and learning strategies also take the form of (1)
and (2), where X is composed of the sequential vectors
{xt, t = 0, ..., T}.
III. CRAFTING ATTACKS FOR ML
In this section, we first give mathematical definitions on
adversarial examples which exploit ML’s vulnerabilities. We
then propose an algorithm, which is a variant of the Neural
Networks attack approach proposed in [16]. Our proposed
algorithm produces adversarial examples for both normal
Neural Networks and sequential models such as RNN.
A. Adversarial Examples
Consider any given supervised ML model fθ with corre-
sponding paired dataset X,Y . We assume that an attacker has
no access to the model f and cannot modify it. Instead we
consider the mild setting that the attacker can only change the
input samples X to X∗ ytto the model to modify its output
fθ(X
∗) such that is not accurate compared to the ground
truth Y . Moreover, to avoid detection by the system operator,
the attacker ensures that adversarial input X∗ is close to the
true inputs X . For instance, an attacker tries to modify the
system voltage wavelet signals such that ML-based power
quality classifier would classify falsely, while making sure that
such changes on signals would not be observed by the system
operator. Formally, the attacker would craft an adversary via
solving the following optimization problem:
max
δX
L(fθ(X
∗), Y ) (4a)
s.t. X∗ = X + δX (4b)
||δX ||d ≤ γ · |X| (4c)
where δX in (4b) is the perturbation we add to the clean
samples X; (4c) constrains the level of perturbation γ allowed
for X∗. Different choices of d for the norm of δX lead to
different constraints on adversarial manipulation:
• d = 0 : (4) has similar objective as the Grad0 attack
proposed by [14], where γ denotes how many dimensions
of input data is allowed to be modified.
• d = ∞ : (4) has similar objective as the Fast Gradient
Sign (FGS) attack proposed by [16], where γ denotes the
maximum level of noise allowed on each dimension of
δX .
We also observe an interesting connection between (2)
(operator) and (4) (adversary), where the ML training al-
gorithm is essentially training over model parameters θ to
minimize model loss; while the adversaries’ task is quite
opposite: to optimize over model inputs X to maximize model
loss. Specifically, we look into the case of Neural Networks
involving highly non-convex model in terms of both X and θ
that have been shown to achieve state of the art performance
in several power system applications. Since solving (2) always
yields an accurate model, we are interested in finding ways to
solve (4) which would provide insights on the vulnerabilities
of Neural Networks used in power systems.
B. Crafting Adversarial Examples
In this sub-section, we propose an efficient attack algorithm
which can incorporate the constraints (4c) with d = 0 and
d =∞ and exploit the vulnerabilities for both normal Neural
Networks and sequential models like RNN.
1) Adversarial Samples without d = 0 Constraint: Since
the optimization problem (4) itself is highly nonconvex and
high-dimensional, it is intractable to achieve the global optimal
solution X∗. Alternatively, since the gradients of L(fθ(X), Y )
encode the loss landscape, we propose a gradient ascent
method on the loss function with respect to X to acquire the
small perturbations which would increase L(fθ(X), Y ):
X∗ = X + δX = X + ∇XL(fθ(X), Y ) (5)
where  controls the noise level added to the clean samples.
Crafting attacks following (5) exactly follows the FGS attack
strategy, which has found vulnerabilities for ML models used
in computer vision. Yet this attack has no constraint on
||δX ||0 ≤ γ · |X|, so attacker has the control and access
to modify every entry of X , which adds relatively large
perturbations to the input.
2) Adversarial Samples with d = 0 Constraint: We now
discuss the constraint on the number of entries the attacker
is allowed to modify. The attacker shall only change the γ ·
|X| input entries, which have the most impact on L(fθ(X +
δX), Y ). Formally, let A define the set of largest γ ·|X| entries
of ∇XL(fθ(X + δX), Y ), while let S denote the entire set
of entries. Then we propose the following operation to get
adversarial samples with constraint ||δX ||0 ≤ γ · |X|:
δAX = ∇XAL(fθ(X), Y ) (6a)
δ
S\A
X = 0 (6b)
Cl
ea
n 
Te
st
 S
am
pl
es
Ad
ve
rs
ar
ia
l T
es
t S
am
pl
es
Ground Truth|NN Classification Results
Normal|Normal
Normal|Sag
Sag|Sag
Sag|Normal
Impulse|Impulse
Impulse|Normal Distortion|Normal
Distortion|Distortion
Vo
lta
ge
 (p
.u
.)
Vo
lta
ge
 (p
.u
.)
Sampling Steps Sampling Steps Sampling Steps Sampling Steps
Sampling Steps Sampling Steps Sampling StepsSampling Steps
Vo
lta
ge
 (p
.u
.)
Vo
lta
ge
 (p
.u
.)
Vo
lta
ge
 (p
.u
.)
Vo
lta
ge
 (p
.u
.)
Vo
lta
ge
 (p
.u
.)
Vo
lta
ge
 (p
.u
.)
Fig. 3: Case studies on power quality signal classification with randomly selected clean samples from our test sets (top) versus corresponding
adversarial samples crafted by Algorithm. 1 (bottom). The original Neural Networks could accurately classify four classes of power signals,
yet it fails to classify adversarial samples with high probability.
S\A denotes the complement set of input entries. The final
adversarial examples can still be generated via X∗ = X+δX .
Since all the ML models considered in this paper, including
normal Neural Networks and RNN structures are all differen-
tiable with respect to input, we highlight the universality of
the proposed algorithm on finding the vulnerabilities of any
trained models.
Note that even though (5) only implements once in our
proposed algorithm without any iterative optimization on δX ,
we show in Section IV that the trained, unknown model is
vulnerable to such attacks.
We also distinguish our work from previous attack and de-
fense research in power systems [18], [19]. Previous research
only exploited the vulnerabilities of state estimation, while
we found weaknesses of general ML tasks in power systems.
Moreover, the proposed algorithm works under the black-box
setting. To put it in other words, the attacker only needs to train
its own version of surrogate ML model f ′θ without knowing
any knowledge of fθ. By finding adversarial examples X∗ of
f ′θ, X
∗ can then be used for attacking unknown ML model fθ
operating in power systems. We summarize the algorithm in
Algorithm 1.
IV. CASE STUDIES
We evaluate the proposed algorithm’s performance on two
tasks: power quality assessment via classifying the voltage
signals by feed-forward Neural Network [4], [11], and short-
term building load forecasting via RNN [9]. We set up the
deep learning models using Tensorflow and Keras, two Python
open-source packages. We adopt rectified linear unit (ReLU)
activation functions, dropout layers and Stochastic Gradient
Descent, a variant of (2) to improve the performance of our
Algorithm 1 Crafting Adversarial Examples
Input: Clean pairing training data X,Y , input entries set A
Input: Training iterations Niter, number of adversarial exam-
ples Nadv
Input: Clean testing samples {xi, yi}, i = 1, ..., Nadv
Initialize: Attacker surrogate ML model f ′θ
Initialize: Adversarial examples set X∗ ← ∅
# Training the surrogate ML model
for iteration= 0, ..., Niter do
Update θ′ using gradient descent (2) on X,Y
end for
# Find adversarial examples using clean data {xi, yi}
for iteration = 0, ..., Nadv do
Calculate gradients w.r.t xi: δxi = ∇xiL(fθ′(xi), yi)
Find set A: the largest γ · |X| gradients of δxi
δ
S\A
xi = 0
x∗i = xi + δxi
end for
X∗.insert(x∗i )
Neural Networks model. Two Nvidia Geforce GTX TITAN
X GPUs are used for training acceleration and the average
training times of both tasks are within 10 seconds.
A. Power Quality Classification
In this task, we would like to investigate if ML model could
detect the power quality disturbances in the waveform signals.
Past research claim that Neural Networks based classifier
would detect those disturbances in signals, which would then
avoid damages and improve the power quality [4], [11]. Here,
we attempt to add slight perturbations to the input signals and
see if such classifier would fail to classify these disturbances.
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Fig. 4: Voltage signal classification accuracy with varying
noise level  and input perturbation percentage γ for adver-
saries X∗.
1) Data Description: We consider four types of wave
signals as illustrated in the first row of Fig. 3, with one
group of normal signals, and three types of disturbances: sags,
impulses and distortion. We construct a labeled dataset with
200 signals from each class, with each signal of fixed length.
After shuffling and separating 14 of the data as testing set,
we construct a 3−layer fully connected Neural Networks to
classify these signals into their respective class.
2) Simulation Results: We firstly observe the Neural Net-
works classifier is powerful in classifying wave signals with
different source of disturbances. The model achieves 97.5%
testing accuracy on the split test data.
Then we test if such trained classifier is able to correctly
classify the adversarial signals crafted by Algorithm 1. As
shown in Fig. 3, with  = 0.03 and γ = 10%, the
black-box classifier wrongly classifies the adversarial signals.
Specifically, the adversarial impulse and distortion signals
look similar to corresponding clean signals, and can be still
classified as impulse and distortion signals by a technician,
yet the ML model incorrectly regards them as normal signals.
As shown in Fig. 4, we qualitatively test the adversaries’
performance by evaluating the Neural Networks’ classification
result on adversarial examples. The model’s classification
accuracy drops drastically with higher level of  and γ, which
meets our assumption. When γ = 40% in which our algorithm
changes 40% entries of the input signal, by only injecting a
small perturbation  = 0.1, the ML model can only classify
67.5% of the test samples.
B. Building Load Forecasting
In this example, we first train an RNN model, which could
forecast building load accurately by using input features such
as temperature measurements, building occupancy and solar
radiation. We then construct sequential adversarial inputs by
using a surrogate model and evaluate the vulnerabilities on the
original load forecasting model.
1) Data Description: We set up our building simulation
platforms using EnergyPlus’s 12-storey large office build-
ing listed in the commercial reference buildings from U.S.
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Fig. 5: Building forecasts results under  = 0.03 and γ = 10.
(a) and (b) the data profiles for one week’s sub-region tem-
perature setpoints and occupancy level before and after the
attack; (c) the ground truth of one week’s energy consumption,
predicted energy consumption using clean testing data and
predicted result after injecting adversarial data profiles.
Department of Energy (DoE CRB) [20]. The building has
a total floor area of 498, 584 square feet which is divided
into 16 separate zones. We simulate the building running
through the year of 2004 in Seattle, WA, and record xt,
yt with a resolution of 10 minutes, where xt includes data
coming from various sensors, such as building occupancy,
temperature setpoint and temperature measurements, and yt
is the building energy consumption. We shuffle and separate
2 months’ data as our stand-alone testing dataset for both
predictive accuracy validation and vulnerabilities testing. The
RNN model is composed of 1 recurrent layer and 2 subsequent
fully-connected layers with a memory length of 2 hours. Our
ML model is also easy to extend to Long Short-Term Memory
network (LSTM) or any other variants of RNN structure. Since
all these architectures are differentiable w.r.t xt, they would
exhibit similar vulnerabilities to proposed adversaries.
MAPE Temp
Deviation
Occupancy
Deviation
Prediction
Error
 = 0.0 0% 0% 5.29%
 = 0.01 0.35% 2.44% 25.90%
 = 0.03 1.07% 6.94% 31.55%
 = 0.05 1.86% 12.36% 55.37%
TABLE I: The building load forecasting performance using
adversarial examples with varying noise level  under γ =
10%. Note when  = 0 it is the case with clean testing data.
2) Simulation Results: We use the Mean Absolute Per-
centage Error (MAPE) to evaluate both the forecasting error
and the input feature deviation caused by adding adversarial
perturbations:
MAPE(var∗, var) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|var∗ − var|
var
× 100% (7)
where var represents either input feature or output energy con-
sumption, while var∗ represents the corresponding adversarial
feature or output energy consumption prediction. We test the
ML model performance by using the same one-week of testing
data with different level of  on adversarial data.
As can be seen in Table. I, the model performs well with
only 5.29% MAPE by using clean data. However, by only
injecting δX with  = 0.01, the model’s forecast has a 25.90%
deviation from the ground truth. The results worsen with more
intense level of noise injected. Meanwhile, the input features
have little deviation from the clean data. We can also visually
inspect the vulnerabilities of the RNN model in Fig. 5 when
we only change 10% of the input features with noise level  =
0.03. The output prediction jumps a lot compared to previous
forecasts, which is not informative for building operators.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this work, we look into the security and vulnerability of
Machine Learning algorithms in power systems to adversaries.
We propose an attack algorithm that universally exploits the
vulnerabilities of ML in power systems, especially Neural
Network based algorithms. The adversarial strategy is practical
as it does not change the system operator’s ML engine but ma-
nipulates only input data. Case studies on two representative
power system examples reveal the vulnerability of proposed
ML algorithms. As researchers haven’t looked into such vul-
nerabilities in current algorithm design, we hope our work
will stimulate future discussions to increase the robustness of
current ML algorithms in power systems to data manipulation.
Going forward, the following directions regarding secure ML
applications are worth investigating, and we are also interested
in investigating security issues of broader estimation/learning
algorithms in power system operation and control.
A. Adversaries in Learning
In this work, we only discuss the scenario that ML models
in power systems output inaccurate results with adversarial
inputs. Stronger attacks such as targeted attack can be consid-
ered where instead of solely maximizing the predicted loss, the
attacker can also add perturbations to falsify trained models to
a new adversarial objective. Such attacks are discussed in our
previous work [14] which can be extended to the case in power
systems. Moreover, there are also vulnerabilities to the model
itself. For instance, attacker would hack into the operation
room to change the weights of trained model. Even though
there is a line of work addressing the security issues in the
control, communication and infrastructure of power systems,
there is scope for work to address the security of learning in
power and cyber-physical systems.
B. Defense for ML Algorithms in Power Systems
Up to now, there has been some work on defending ML
attacks in the research of computer vision. Yet most of them
operate on the ensemble or filtering of input images [21],
which may not be applicable for power systems as most of
applications involved in power have clear physical definitions
on the features involved that may no be modifiable. Thus the
defense against such intrusion attacks on ML algorithms in
power systems is still a urgent yet open problem.
REFERENCES
[1] M. H. Albadi and E. F. El-Saadany, “A summary of demand response
in electricity markets,” Electric power systems research, vol. 78, no. 11,
pp. 1989–1996, 2008.
[2] M. R. Patel, Wind and solar power systems: design, analysis, and
operation. CRC press, 2005.
[3] Y. Chen, Y. Wang, D. Kirschen, and B. Zhang, “Model-free renewable
scenario generation using generative adversarial networks,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Power Systems, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 3265–3275, 2018.
[4] M. Valtierra-Rodriguez, R. de Jesus Romero-Troncoso, R. A. Osornio-
Rios, and A. Garcia-Perez, “Detection and classification of single and
combined power quality disturbances using neural networks,” IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Electronics, vol. 61, no. 5, pp. 2473–2482,
2014.
[5] P. Li, H. Wang, and B. Zhang, “A distributed online pricing strategy for
demand response programs,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.05551, 2017.
[6] Y. Wang, Q. Chen, D. Gan, J. Yang, D. S. Kirschen, and C. Kang, “Deep
learning-based socio-demographic information identification from smart
meter data,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2018.
[7] Y. LeCun, Y. Bengio, and G. Hinton, “Deep learning,” nature, vol. 521,
no. 7553, p. 436, 2015.
[8] T. Hong, P. Pinson, S. Fan, H. Zareipour, A. Troccoli, and R. J.
Hyndman, “Probabilistic energy forecasting: Global energy forecasting
competition 2014 and beyond,” 2016.
[9] Y. Chen, Y. Shi, and B. Zhang, “Modeling and optimization of complex
building energy systems with deep neural networks,” in Signals, Systems,
and Computers, 2017 51st Asilomar Conference on. IEEE, 2017, pp.
1368–1373.
[10] Y. Chen, X. Wang, and B. Zhang, “An unsupervised deep learning ap-
proach for scenario forecasts,” Power Systems Computation Conference
(PSCC), 2018.
[11] R. Eskandarpour and A. Khodaei, “Machine learning based power grid
outage prediction in response to extreme events,” IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 3315–3316, 2017.
[12] C. Lassetter, E. Cotilla-Sanchez, and J. Kim, “Learning schemes for
power system planning and control.” in System Sciences (HICSS), 51st
Hawaii International Conference on, 2018.
[13] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, A. Swami, and R. Harang, “Crafting ad-
versarial input sequences for recurrent neural networks,” in Military
Communications Conference, MILCOM 2016-2016 IEEE. IEEE, 2016,
pp. 49–54.
[14] H. Hosseini, Y. Chen, S. Kannan, B. Zhang, and R. Poovendran,
“Blocking transferability of adversarial examples in black-box learning
systems,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.04318, 2017.
[15] H. Hahn, S. Meyer-Nieberg, and S. Pickl, “Electric load forecasting
methods: Tools for decision making,” European journal of operational
research, vol. 199, no. 3, pp. 902–907, 2009.
[16] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
[17] T. Mikolov, M. Karafia´t, L. Burget, J. Cˇernocky`, and S. Khudanpur,
“Recurrent neural network based language model,” in Eleventh Annual
Conference of the International Speech Communication Association,
2010.
[18] Y. Liu, P. Ning, and M. K. Reiter, “False data injection attacks against
state estimation in electric power grids,” ACM Transactions on Informa-
tion and System Security (TISSEC), vol. 14, no. 1, p. 13, 2011.
[19] Y. Huang, M. Esmalifalak, H. Nguyen, R. Zheng, Z. Han, H. Li,
and L. Song, “Bad data injection in smart grid: attack and defense
mechanisms,” IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 27–
33, 2013.
[20] P. Torcellini, M. Deru, B. Griffith, K. Benne, M. Halverson,
D. Winiarski, and D. Crawley, “Doe commercial building benchmark
models,” in Proceeding of, 2008, pp. 17–22.
[21] F. Trame`r, A. Kurakin, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, D. Boneh, and
P. McDaniel, “Ensemble adversarial training: Attacks and defenses,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.07204, 2017.
